Denver Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 4

Article 5

January 1983

The Commodities Futures Trading Commission and Suitability:
Now You See It, Now You Don't
M. Van Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
M. Van Smith, The Commodities Futures Trading Commission and Suitability: Now You See It, Now You
Don't, 60 Denv. L.J. 613 (1983).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Now You SEE IT, Now

AND SUITABILITY:

YOU DON'T
M.
I.

VAN SMITH*

INTRODUCTION

In September 1977, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission

(CFTC or Commission) proposed customer protection rules, one of which
would have required commodity futures brokers to determine whether commodity futures trading was suitable for customers.' When the Commission
adopted the proposed customer protection rules, however, it did not adopt
the suitability rule. 2 The CFTC announced its action as being for the protection of customers. 3 Yet, despite what the CFTC announced, the thesis of
*

L.L.B. University of Colorado, 1959; Member Bar Associations of California and

Colorado.
1. (a) [No broker may], directly or indirectly make any recommendation to any customer concerning the purchase, sale or continued holding of any commodity interest,
or may effect, directly or indirectly, any transaction in a commodity interest for a
customer pursuant to discretionary power . . . unless [the broker]:
(1) Within a reasonable period of time before the recommendation or transaction,
(i) Obtained from the customer the essential facts about the customer's financial
condition and trading objectives, and
(ii) Verified with the customer the accuracy of that information if previously
obtained and
(2) At the time of the recommendation or transaction, had reason to believe
that the recommendation or transaction was suitable for the customer in light of
(i) The information obtained from the customer and otherwise known about the
customer . . . and
(ii) The risk of loss involved therein.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "recommendation" means any advice,
suggestion or other statement that is intended, or can reasonably be expected, to influence a customer to purchase, sell or hold a commodity interest, but does not include
any statement that merely describes in an objective fashion the commodity interest,
the manner in which it is traded or the services of [the broker].
(c) This section does not apply to recommendations furnished solely through(I)
Uniform publications distributed to subscribers thereto,
(2) Books,
(3) Television or radio communications, or
(4) Seminar or lecture presentations.
Protection of Commodity Customers: Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,750 reprinted in [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,474, at 21,940 (Sept. 6, 1977).
2. Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, reprinted tn [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,642, at 22,623 (July 24, 1978) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 1.33) [hereinafter cited as Customer Protection Rules].
3. On October 1, 1978, William T. Bagley, Chairman of the CFTC, announced the commission's action.
Starting as a brand new regulatory Commission three and one-half years ago, we have
now virtually completed a new book of rules for commodity traders and the public.
These much-needed customer protections are another step toward assuring a smoothworking marketplace that has greater safeguards for the participants.
The phenomenal growth of futures trading in recent years, with new contracts in
both the traditional commodities and the attractive new financial instrument futures,
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this article is that the Commission declined to adopt a suitability rule so that
brokers would not have a duty to determine whether commodity futures
trading is suitable rather than to protect customers. This article reviews the
history of the suitability concept, discusses the ways suitability duty can be
enforced by the common law, and concludes that the efforts of the CFTC to
obstruct the development of a suitability duty will ultimately fail.
II.
A.

THE CONCEPT OF SUITABILITY

General Principles

In investing, one person's meat is another person's poison. A suitable
investment for a young widow with children who has recently received
$150,000 in life insurance proceeds on which she must rely for support differs
from what is suitable for a doctor who makes $150,000 a year. "Suitability"
is the label given to the concept to express the appropriateness of an invest4
ment or speculation in the light of the finances and objectives of customers.
The concept of suitability was endemic to the brokerage community
long before it was adopted as a legal concept. The essence of the brokerage
suitability concept is investments that conform to the needs and goals of the
particular investor. 5 A well-known writer on investing, Roger Babson,
stated, "[t]he proper investment procedure for an individual depends largely
on his personal circumstances. He must reckon not only the amount of his
capital and his financial position but his family responsibilities, his temperahas brought thousands of new investors into the market and swelled the ranks of the
professionals who serve them, he said.
Because of this, the Commission has answered the need for shoring up the framework in which the industry operates.
These customer protection rules come as a follow-up to steps taken earlier to effect
improvements in the in-house operations of exchanges, brokerage houses and other
commodity firms, through such things as strengthened registration, reporting and
minimum financial requirements, and through exchange rule enforcement reviews.
Under the rules that go into effect October 1 [1978], customers are going to get
from futures commission merchants risk disclosure statements prepared by the CFTC,
which the customer must acknowledge before opening an account.
CFTC Release No. 432-78 (Oct. 1, 1978).
4. See generally Roach, The Suitability
Obltgations of Brokers.- Present Law and the ProposedFederalSecurithes Code, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1067 (1978) (survey of the development of suitability for all
forms of investment).
5. See INVESTMENT AND INVESTORs 49 (P. Rossi ed., 21st ed. 1936). This book sets forth
an elaborate scheme for classifying individuals with respect to their suitability for different kinds
of investments:
GROUP I.-Investors who rely entirely for their maintenance upon the income produced by their investments.
(a) Rich people who have more than sufficient income.
(b) Well-to-do people who need not strain their investments.
(c) People moderately well off who must make a large income.
(d) People who are compelled to make their investments produce the largest
possible income.
GROUP II.-Investors who live partly on their present efforts and partly on the income produced by their investments.
(a) People with ample means.
(b)
People with insufficient income from earnings but ample income from investments.
(c) People with insufficient income from earnings and a small capital.
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ment, and the goal for which he is striving."'6
Professor Paul Fenlon, of the University of Texas Business School, analyzed the profiles of various investors to determine the suitability of investGROUP III.-Investors who live entirely on the results of their present efforts.
(a) People with surplus earnings, which they apply towards increasing their capital, the income from which is already sufficient to provide for their wants.
(b) People with surplus earnings, which they apply towards the building up of a
capital, the income from their present capital being still insufficient to keep them.
(c) People with a moderate surplus and a very moderate capital, or no capital at
all.
Differences in investment policy for these classes are set forth:
CLASS 1.-The provision of a definite capital sum for educational or other purposes
within a short term of years.
CLASS 2.-A policy suitable for investors who are not dependent on the income from
their capital, and who, for various reasons, anticipate the necessity of realizing substantial sums from time to time at very short notice.
CLASS 3.-A policy suitable for investors who have sufficient income for their present
needs but who wish to accumulate as much capital as possible against the time when
they retire.
CLASS 4.-A policy suitable for those who do not anticipate the necessity to realize
capital but who want to benefit as much as possible from their capital immediately
and who, therefore, desire as large an income as possible without taking unreasonable
risks.
6. R. BABSON, INVESTMENT FUNDAMENTALS 261 (3d ed. 1935). Babson classified investors as very conservative investors, conservative investors, average investors, businessmen, and
speculators. Id He outlined the suitability of investments for each class of investor as follows:
BABSON WORKING PLAN FOR YOUR MONEY
Specimen Schedule of Distribution
Very
Conservative
Investor

Conservative
Investor

One with
small resources,
or a fiduciary
investor,
a
trustee, a bank,
and also the
investor who
desires
very
conservative
issues.

One with
limited
resources, or a
bank, a trustee,
and the investor
who
wants
conservative
securities.

One
gives

He buys
bonds only
(Part II).

His bond
holdings
predominate
but he buys a
few
stocks,
mostly from the
gradual growth
standpoint
(Part III).

He divides
his resources
equally between
bonds
and
stocks. He, too,
buys
some
gradual growth
stocks
but
concentrates
more on Part I,
using the major
stock

Average
Investor

who
a

reasonable
degree
of
attention
to
investments and
has ordinary
resources.

Business
Man

Speculator

The
investor who
has a
fairly
substantial
income
from
business and is
in a position to
assume
some
risk.

One who
devotes his time
largely to stocks
with the idea
that
appreciation in
value
is
of
primary
importance.

A backlog
of
bonds
is
essential for him
but more risk
may
be
assumed and
perhaps 70% of
his funds be
placed in stocks.

The
backlog
of
bonds may be
cut down but
should never be
omitted. Stocks
bought
for
appreciation
are, however,
his mainstay.

movements
which conform
to the business
areas.
In no instance is margin trading advised. Buy bonds and stocks outright and put them in
your own box. Id at 267.
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ment decisions for them. 7 There was no discussion, however, concerning any
legal duty that customers be advised of what is suitable.

B.

Early Suitabilhty Rules

The first suitability rule was promulgated in 1939 as article III, section
2 of the National Association of Securities Dealer's Rules of Fair Practice. 8
This rule was probably only intended to state a rule of ethics. 9 If the first
suitability rules were rules of ethics which were not intended to give rise to
legal liability, they became rules to which legal liability attached when the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) used suitability rules to hold
brokers liable in disciplinary proceedings. 10 The process of suitability rules
evolving into rules of legal liability continued as brokers were found liable in
fraud for advising customers to make unsuitable investments.1 " Since 1939,
the suitability concept has become recognized by lawyers as one of the major
2
philosophical themes of the securities laws. ,
Despite this development in the field of securities, there has not been a
comparable recognition of the suitability concept for commodity futures.
This is not because suitability is irrelevant to commodity futures. In 1933,
Telford Taylor, an official of the Roosevelt administration, called for protection of inexperienced customers involved in speculative investments. Not
only did he see a need for customer protection, but he also saw the need for
broker regulation. 13 In 1937, Harold Irwin, an economist with the Commodity Exchange Commission and one of the leading students of commodity
4
futures trading, expressed similar thoughts.1
Despite the relevancy of suitability rules for commodity futures, however, the philosophy of the Commodity Exchange Act' 5 was not conducive
7.

P. FENLON, INVESTMENT DECISIONS:

A CASE BOOK (1972).

8. In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a

member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as
to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
[19761 NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2152, at 2051.
9. See O'Boyle, Suitability, in CONFERENCE ON SEcuRrrITES REGULATION 94 (R. Mund-

heim ed. 1964). Philip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel of the SEC, stated: "[t]he concept of
suitability originated with the NASD as an ethical principle." Id at 103.
10. See, e.g., Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133 (1960); RH. Johnson & Co., 33 S.E.C. 180

(1952).
11. See, e.g., Twomey v. Mitchum Jones & Templeton, 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr.
222 (1968).
12. See Lipton, The Customer Suitability Doctrine, in PLI FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON

SECURITIES REGULATION 273 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., & J. Schepper eds. 1973) (prepared statement of M. Lipton).
13. See Taylor, Trading in Commodity Futures. A New Standardof Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63,

103-04 (1933). Taylor commented:
[s]teps must be taken for the protection of the gullible and the inexperienced. The
past eighty years have amply demonstrated that the general public is easily enticed
into the field of speculation. Men need some organized restraint upon their tendency
to gamble as much as upon their inclination to drink. And brokers stand in need of
regulation of their dealings with the public as much as do the merchants of securities.
Both are fields in which the parties cannot safely be left on to the law of offer and
acceptance and their own consciences.
14. See Irwin, Legal Status of Tradng in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REV. 155, 169 (1937).

15. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
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to the development of suitability rules. The basic purpose of the Commodity
Exchange Act was not to protect public traders, but to protect commodity
futures markets from manipulation. 16 The protection of the public which
traded commodity futures was incidental to this purpose. In contrast, the
basic purpose of federal securities legislation was and is to protect the public
investor. 17
III.
A.

THE HISTORY OF SUITABILITY IN COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING

Suitabihty to Avoid Illegality

The practice of complying with what amounted to a suitability duty
dissipated the impetus for suitability rules in the area of commodity futures.
Even though a suitability duty was not stated in a rule, suitability was an
innominate presence. One way the suitability concept manifested itself was
in the control the courts had through the rule requiring an intent to deliver.
The general rule is that transactions are illegal if the parties do not intend to
deliver, but rather to settle on price differences.18 The custom in commodity
futures contracts is to settle on price differences,' 9 and as a consequence, a
pall of illegality has hung over commodity futures transactions. 20 This
anomaly persisted until the state laws which conflicted with the federal regulations were finally preempted in 1974.21
Brokerage firms had to be selective with whom they did business. They
dared not do business with a person for whom commodity futures were unsuitable for fear that a customer would challenge the legality of the transaction. 22 In Ohlendorfv. Bennett, 23 for example, an action was brought by the
16. The purpose of the Act was stated:
Transactions in commodity involving the sale thereof for future delivery as commonly
conducted on boards of trade and known as "futures" are affected with a national
public interest . . . the transactions and prices of commodity on such boards of trade
are susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control and sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations in the prices thereof frequently occur as a result of such speculation, manipulation, or control which are detrimental to the producer or the consumer and the
person handling commodity and products and by-products there in interstate commerce, and such fluctuations in prices are an obstruction to and a burden upon interstate commerce in commodity and the products and by-products thereof and under
regulation imperative for the protections of such commerce and the national public
interest therein.
Id
17. S. REP. No. 41, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1933).
18. See 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS 662 (1962); Taylor, supra note 13, at 63.
19.

See REPORT OF THE GRAIN FUTURES ADMINISTRATION 46 (1924); Note, Legislation

Affecting Commodity and Stock Exchanges, 45 HARv. L. REV. 912, 913-14, nn. 8-9 (1932).
20.

See T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING FOR COMMERCIAL AND PER-

SONAL PROFIT 57 (197 1); Smith, Preventing the Mompzulation of Commodiy Futures Markets.- To Deiver or Not To Delver?, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1575 (1981).
21. See Smith, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and The Return of The Bucketeers." A
Lesson In Regulatoty Failure, 57 N.D.L. REV. 7, 15 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188 (1933); Irvin v. Williar, 110 U.S.
499 (1884); Roundtree v. Smith, 108 U.S. 269 (1883); Lyons Milling Co. v. Coffee & Carkener,
46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931); Riordon v. McCabe, 341 Ill. 506, 173 N.E. 660 (1930); Irwin, Legal
Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REv. 155, 165-69 (1937).
23. 241 11. App. 537 (1926).
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receiver of a bank to recover money which a cashier wrongfully withdrew
and paid to brokers for his losses in grain futures trading. The cashier was a
young man with limited business experience, supporting a family, and had
never made more than $125 a month. The value of the cashier's property
did not exceed $10,000.24 The cashier testified he could not have delivered
25
or taken delivery. The evidence showed the trading was illegal gambling.
Although the name of the game was illegality, the result was to vitiate
transactions which today would be labeled unsuitable. Consequently, even
though there was no suitability rule for commodity futures, brokers had to
comply with what amounted to a suitability duty to avoid the defense of
illegality. If they did not comply and an account went into a deficit, the
2 6
practice was to write these deficits off as uncollectable.
B.

The Effict of Increased Trading

In the mid-1960's, there was a great increase in the public participation
in commodity futures markets. 27 This increasing involvement brought a
concomitant need to protect the public. In 1970, Alex Caldwell, Administrator of the Commodity Exchange Authority, expressed his views about
what the agency was doing toward developing antifraud rules which would
require, among other things, that the commodity broker make a suitability
inquiry. 28 In a letter written to this writer in September of 1970, Mr. Caldwell stated:
You will be interested in knowing that some time ago we requested
the Department's General Counsel to determine the extent of the
Secretary's rule making authority in this entire area. We have
asked that proposed legislation be drafted if it is necessary to extend to commodity customers the same type of safeguards now
available to security customers. This study currently is underway.
Insofar as exchange suitability rules are concerned, over 18
months ago we requested all contract markets to adopt regulations
designed to give added protection to customers whose accounts are
handled on a controlled or discretionary basis. Among such regulations was one which would have required brokerage firms to
learn the essential facts relating to each customer, including his
financial resources and trading objectives. Another would have required each controlled or discretionary account to be given diligent
supervision to see that the trading in the account is consistent with
the customer's trading objectives and his financial resources. While
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange recently adopted new regulations somewhat along the lines we proposed, no other contract market has taken action. It is for this reason that we requested the
Department's General Counsel to conduct its current review of this
24. Id. at 550.

25. Id at 551.
26. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 63.
27. See Bagley, A New Body of Law In An Era of Indusity Growth, 27 EMORY L.J. 849 (1978).
28. Letter from Alex Caldwell Administrator, Commodity Exchange Authority, to M. Van
Smith (Sept. 17, 1970) (discussing agency development of antifraud rules) (available at the
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29

The provision of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to which Mr. Caldwell referred was Rule 942, subsection E, 30 which required supervision of the
discretionary accounts by the clearing members, "to see that trading in such
an account is not overly excessive in an amount or frequency in relation to
31
the equity in the account."
Regulation 1992 of the Chicago Board of Trade 32 set forth regulations
for discretionary accounts and provided that "[ejach account with respect to
which employee has discretionary authority must be given continuous supervisions by the employer, . . . to see that trading in such account is not exces' 33
sive in size or frequency in relation to financial resources in the account."
The only exchange which had a suitability rule for nondiscretionary
accounts was the New York Mercantile Exchange. Rule 48.01 of the New
York Mercantile Exchange 34 required every brokerage firm to use due diligence in learning the facts relative to every customer and the nature of that
customer's account. Brokerage firms were also required to keep informed of
the character and volume of trading in every account opened. 35 Although
the rule did not explicitly state that the brokerage firm had a duty to determine whether commodity futures trading was suitable for a prospective customer, this duty was implicit in requiring brokerage firms to inquire into the
facts relative to every customer, and into the nature of the customer's
account.
In 1973, Mr. Caldwell testified before a congressional committee con36
ducting hearings on legislation to amend the Commodity Exchange Act.
He spoke of the need to establish suitability rules. "We would like to have a
standard rule under which the members of all exchanges would be required
to delve into the needs of a particular customer to trade in the market, his
' 37
financial ability to do so-and other matters."
C. Protection of the Pubh'c
The protection of the public involved in futures trading became one of
the main purposes of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974.38 In accordance with this purpose, the CFTC established the Advisory
Committee on Commodity Futures Trading Professionals to study and rec39
ommend standards for the regulation of professionals.
The committee recommended that brokers be required to have a rea29. Id.
30. Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule 942(E) (1970).
31. Id.
32. Chicago Bd. of Trade Reg. 1992 (1970).

33. Id.
34. New York Mercantile Exchange Guide § 48.01.
35. Id.
36. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
37. Hearings before the Subcaomm. on Special Small Busine6s Problems of the Permanent Select House
Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1973) (Statement of Alex Caldwell).
38. H.R. 13,113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1974); see Leist v. Simplot, [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. 21,051, at 24,180 (2d Cir. July 8, 1980).
39. 40 Fed. Reg. 32,866 (1975).
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sonable ground for believing that each recommendation they make is suita40
ble in light of customers' financial condition, objectives, and other factors.
In discussing suitability, the committee noted that a suitability duty is of
particular importance in commodities trading because of the wide variety of
trading programs that are available to customers. 4 I As part of a suitability
duty, the committee recommended that brokers should "obtain from each
customer complete information as to his income, net worth, number of dependents, etc."' 42 The duty to know customers "must be a continuing one.
A customer's financial situation and capacity for risk taking may change
from what it was when he opened the account." 43 In the view of the committee, brokers, "should know their customers not only for the purpose of
making suitable recommendations but also to avoid situations in which a
defaulting customer might jeopardize the entire firm and other customers." 44 In order not to jeopardize their firm, brokers should determine if and
to what extent their customers are trading with other firms.
The CFTC proposed suitability regulations in September 197745 which
followed the recommendations of the Advisory Committee. 46 The proposed
rule prohibited commodity professionals from recommending trades, or trading pursuant to discretionary authority, unless the trading professional has
1) obtained from a customer the essential facts about a customer's financial
condition and trading objectives, and 2) has reason to believe that the position would be suitable for the customer based on information known to the
professional. 47 The CFTC explained that, "[t]he suitability of a position
would depend on whether the risk of loss involved was (a) one that the customer could safely assume in light of his financial condition and
(b) consistent with the customer's trading objectives."' 48 In its comment on
the proposed suitability rule, the CFTC stated that the suitability determination consisted of two different judgments:
(1) Whether commodity trading in general is suitable for the
customer in view of his trading objective and financial condition
and, (2) if so, whether the particular position that is the subject of
the recommendation in discretionary trade is suitable. The latter
requirement reflects the fact that the risk of loss can vary widely
depending on the size of the trade, the volatility and market liquidity of the commodity involved, and the amount of margin
49
required.
40. Report of the Commodit Futures Trading Comm'n Advisory Comm. on Commodit Futures Trading
Professionals, COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) Report No. 29, Part II at ii (Aug. 20, 1976).
41. Id at 11.

42. Id.
43. Id
44. Id

at 10.
at 11.

45. Proposed Rulemaking of the CFTC, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742 (1977), reprtntedin [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH), 20,474 (Sept. 6, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Proposed Rulemaking].
46. Id.
47. Id at 44,743; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. at 21,928.

48. Id
49. Id. at 44,744; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. at 21,929. The CFTC
gave the following example:
Thus, in recommending to a customer the purchase of 10 future contracts of a particu-
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The CFTC adopted the proposed customer protection rules in July
1978.50 When the CFTC adopted these customer protection rules, however,
51
it declined to adopt a suitability rule.
IV.

THE RATIONALE FOR REJECTION OF THE RULE

The CFTC stated two reasons for not adopting a suitability rule. The
first reason was the inability of the CFTC "to formulate meaningful standards of universal application." 52 The second reason was that a rule would
merely codify principles implicit in the antifraud provisions of the Act, and
the benefits to be gained by codification were outweighed by the risk of un53
These reasons were a
intentionally narrowing the scope of the provisions.
pretense.
A.

The Universal Standard

Suitability is based on the notion that risks should be judged according
to the finances, needs, and objectives of customers as individuals. Customers
cannot be treated as individuals if suitability is to be determined by a "universal" standard. When the CFTC proposed the suitability rule, it requested
comment on the "appropriateness of specific suitability standards, such as a
requirement that commodity customers have a minimum net worth (e.g.,
$50,000), annual gross income (e.g., $25,000), account equity (e.g., $10,000)
4
or some combination of those factors." '5 What the CFTC specifically had in
contemplated net worth and init
probably
but
discussed,
never
mind was
come criteria similar to those that have been adopted by states for tax shelter
55
investments.
The appeal of these criteria to brokers is that they require no judgment
to apply. If the criteria of suitability are a net worth of $50,000 and income
of $25,000 per year, the decision about suitability has been made; all a broker need do is assure himself that a customer indeed has a net worth of
$50,000 and income of $25,000.
Although objective criteria require no thought to administer, they are,
by definition, somewhat arbitrary. 56 The efficacy of objective criteria delar commodity the professional would be required to have a reasonable basis for believing that the risk of loss from an adverse price movement could be absorbed by the
customer without undue hardship. If the professional thought the risk of buying 10
contracts was too great, the proper recommendation might be to purchase fewer
contracts.
50. Customer Protection Rules, supra note 2, at 31,886; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
CoMM. FUT. L. REP. at 22,623.
51. Id. at 31,889; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 22,625.
52. Id
53. Id
54. 42 Fed. Reg. 44,744, reprinted in [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
20,474, at 21,930 (Sept. 6, 1977).
(CCH)
55. See Murdock, Tax Sheltered Securities: Is There a Broker-Dealer in the Woodwork?, 25 HASTINGS LJ. 518 (1974).
56. In a curious twist, one writer argues that arbitrary standards are necessary to avoid
brokers being intimidated into not advising customers in their best interest for fear a trade may
later be found to be unsuitable. See Hudson, Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures Market, 58
B.U.L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1978).
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pends on how relevant they are to the investment. In the case of tax shelter
investments, a requirement that an investor be in a fifty percent tax bracket
is relevant. A substantial part of the return of any tax shelter is the tax
benefits to be derived, benefits which obviously cannot be realized by persons who do not have a high enough income tax bracket to make use of tax
write-offs. These tax write-offs compensate for the generally higher than
normal risk of tax shelter ventures. Consequently, even though a criterion
based on a tax bracket is an objective criterion, it makes sense because tax
benefits are essential to the suitability of tax shelter investments.
This is not necessarily true for other speculative ventures. Persons of
modest income may be able to afford to speculate if they do not have family
obligations or financial obligations.5 7 Persons of modest finances often can
evaluate the risk of speculative ventures as well as those who are well-off.
Furthermore, there is the problem of deciding what is speculative, a decision
which the public resents being made for them by government.
Because of the leverage possible in speculating on margin, commodity
futures trading offers the opportunity to make significant amounts of money
with relatively little capital. This opportunity may be an illusion, but it is
cherished nonetheless. A suitability rule which would bar persons from trading who do not meet a prescribed net worth or income requirement would
arouse too much customer resentment to win compliance. And then there
would be no assurance that commodity futures trading would be suitable for
the person who met financial requirements. 58
In its commentary that accompanied the proposed customer protection
rules, the CFTC expressed skepticism about an objective standard of suitability. 59 The CFTC has done nothing to formulate a universal standard
since it declined to adopt a suitability rule. One must doubt how seriously
the CFTC believes in a universal standard.
B.

Suilability as Implicit inAntifraud Provtsins

The second reason asserted by the CFTC for not adopting a suitability
rule was that a suitability rule would merely codify principles implicit in the
antifraud provision of the Act and there would be too much risk of narrowing the duty by incorporating it in a rule. 6° The CFTC, however, never
explained how a suitability duty would have been narrowed by being stated
in the general rule proposed by the CFTC. The narrowing rationale was
actually relied on as a reason for not adopting the churning and due diligence rules the CFTC had proposed as part of its customer protection
57. See, e.g.,
Tucker v. Economic Systems, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. 20,480 (CCH) (CFTC Aug. 25, 1977) (suitability determined in view of client's resources, responsibilities, and objectives).
58. Bernard Kummerli, a compulsive speculator, lost $20 million and brought down the
United California Bank of Basel, Switzerland, by speculating in cocoa futures. See Smith, Are
You Suitable For Trading?, COMMODITIES 32 (Oct. 1977).

59. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 45, at 44,744; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
at 21,929.
60. Customer Protection Rules, supra note 2, at 31,889; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. at 22,625.
FUT. L. REP.
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rules. 6 1 This rationale was applied as an afterthought to justify the CFTC's
62
rejection of a suitability rule.
Under the theory that a suitability duty was implicit in the antifraud
provisions of the law, administrative law judges of the CFTC have said that
firms who sell unsuitable commodity futures to customers can be held liable
for fraud. 6 3 The CFTC, however, has hinted that it may reject the notion
that suitability is implicit in the antifraud provisions of the Act. In two cases
in which the CFTC reviewed reparation awards in which administrative law
judges had reasoned that suitability was implicit in the antifraud provisions
of the Commodity Exchange Act, the CFTC stated, in footnotes to its decisions, that it refused to adopt the administrative law judges' reasoning, 64
although the CFTC affirmed the awards. The significance of this dicta is
difficult to predict. The CFTC did not state why it did not agree with the
statements of the administrative law judges or what its own views on suitability were.
Commentators anxious to be rid of suitability, however, have had no
trouble in attaching significance to the footnoted statements. Referring to
the Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. 65 footnote, it was recently stated that,
"the CFTC has unequivocally determined that there is no customer suitability standard implicit to any of the provisions of the Commodity Exchange
Act."

66

Yet, to exorcise suitability from the antifraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, it will take more than merely stating that suitability is
not present. The antifraud provisions of the Act were adopted in 1936 to
incorporate the duties of agency in the broker-customer relationship. 67 The
antifraud provisions, therefore, incorporate the duties arising out of agency.
Suitability is a material fact which a broker, as an agent, has a duty to
disclose. 68
61. Id.

62. "The Commission is not adopting the proposed suitability rule (proposed Sec. 166.2),
but may adopt such a rule at a later time if meaningful standards can be developed." Id
63. See, e.g., Jensen v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,062 (CFTC July 28, 1980) (futures commission merchant who trades
with a client whom he had reason to believe cannot assume the risks raises a presumption of
fraud); Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuTr. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,738 (CFTC Jan. 11, 1979) (failure to disclose material facts is a breach of fiduciary
duty); Hauser v. Rosenthal & Co. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,731 (CFTC Jan. 4, 1979) (futures commission merchants must meet the high ethical standards applied to the securities industry); Dwyer v. Murlas Brothers Commodities, Inc., [19771980 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,520 (CFTC Nov. 21, 1977) (breach of
fiduciary duty in commodity futures exchange constituted fraud).
64. Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,379, at 25,830 n.4 (CFTC Apr. 13, 1982); Jensen v. Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) $ 21,324 at 25,582, n.l (CFTC
Oct. 9, 1981).
65. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 25,830, n.4.
66. See Miller & Zarfes, No Customer Suitability Rule But AP's Recklessness Bnngs Recovety,
COMMODITIES LAW LETTER 4 (May 1982).
67. See J. BAER & 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 261
(1949) (setting forth digest of Act written in 1936 by N.M. Mehl, Administrator of the Commodity Exchange Authority, the agency which regulated futures markets until 1975).
68. See infia notes 69-71; Smith, Breaking the Chains That Bind- Arbitration Agreements Versus
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A Conflict of Interest

The CFTC's somewhat jumbled rationale for refusing to adopt a suitability rule invites interpolation as to other possible factors affecting the Commission's decision. One explanation is the way the United States brokerage
business has become high volume retailing, as seen by the "Madison Avenue" advertising of some brokerage firms. 69 Brokers are salesmen who are
paid for what they sell, not on how much their customers make. Because of
their high fixed overhead, brokers must sell in volume. Commissions on
commodity futures transactions are charged only when a trade is closed out.
The commission per contract is low, varying from .2% to .6% of the value of
a contract. 70 For these reasons brokers are under relentless pressure to induce their customers to trade in and out of markets with heavy positions.
To sell in volume, a broker cannot be overly concerned with suitability.
If it comes down to a choice between selling and deciding that commodity
futures trading is unsuitable, brokers opt to sell. Brokers see the problem not
as a matter of choice, but as a matter of business survival.
If suitability rules are incompatible with volume merchandizing, should
futures brokers have to comply with suitability rules? The ever-present conflict of interest inherent in high volume retailing was considered by attorney
Thomas O'Boyle, at a Securities Conference at Duke University in 1964.
O'Boyle commented that stressing an image of professionalism the regulatory authorities may do a disservice to the public if that status of profession71
alism does not in fact exist.
If brokers sold tangible products, one might be able to take O'Boyle's
suggestion seriously. But brokers sell intangible merchandise. Customers
cannot see, feel, or test what a broker sells. Moreover, by the time customers
have the experience to evaluate commodity futures trading, they may have
already lost their investment.
Regardless of whether it is wise or unwise to do so, customers rely on
their brokers' advice, and most brokers expect to advise their customers. As
long as this is a legitimate expectation, advice must be honest. To accomplish the goal of giving honest advice, the advisor must subordinate his interest to that of the person being advised. 72 This is true of any professional
Forum Rights Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
749, 759 n.44 (1979).
69. In contrast to American brokers, the London Stock Exchange forbids advertising by
member firms, advertising being considered inimical to the mutual relationship of trust between
broker and customer. See Cohen & Rabin, Broker-DealerSelling Practice Standards. The Importance
ofAdministrative Adjidication in Their Development, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 691, n.88 (1964).
70.

See B. GOULD, DOW-JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO COMMODITIES TRADING 64 (1973).

71. See O'Boyle, supra note 9, at 100.
72. See H. BINES, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT I 4.01[2](a], 4-12 (1978). William 0. Douglas observed this in 1936 in a speech to a school maintained by the New York
Stock Exchange for employees of brokerage firms:
He who holds himself as rendering this investment counsel and this service to customers should be held to high fiduciary standards of conduct. If he who gives this advice
and encourages and stimulates his customer's purchases and sales has a self-interest in
the transaction over and above his salary or regular compensation, his customer is apt
to receive not unbiased and disinterested advice but advice discolored by the selfinterest which such purchases and sales will serve. The presence of this self-interest
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advice, whether it be by a lawyer, doctor, or commodity futures broker.
To avoid the duty required by suitability rules, brokers would have to
abstain from giving advice. 73 There are a few brokers who do not advise,
acting solely as order takers; however, this is atypical. Most brokers want to
sell, and to sell, they think they must advise.
Because customers rely on brokers for advice, the written disclosure
statement which the CFTC adopted as a palliative for not adopting a suitability rule was a sham. 74 Written disclosure statements are no match for aggressive selling. 75 In a speech on December 7, 1979, before the American
Bar Association National Institute on Commodities Regulation, James
Stone, then chairman of the CFTC, warned that a disclosure statement
could be easily undermined by salestalk. He called for integrity throughout
76
the sales process in order to adequately serve customers' needs.
will deprive the customers of the benefit of disinterested and impartial advice, the very
thing which presumably the customer thinks he is getting.
Se. W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 114-15 U. Allen ed. 1940).
73. See Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975).
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1982) which provides:
This statement is furnished to you because rule 1.55 of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission requires it.
The risk of loss in trading commodity futures contracts can be substantial. You
should therefore carefully consider whether such trading is suitable for you in light of
your financial condition. In considering whether to trade, you should be aware of the
following:
(1)You may sustain a total loss of the initial margin funds and any additional
funds that you deposit with your broker to establish or maintain a position in the
commodity futures market. If the market moves against your position, you may be
called upon by your broker to deposit a substantial amount of additional margin
funds, on short notice, in order to maintain your position. If you do not provide the
required funds within the prescribed time, your position may be liquidated at a loss,
and you will be liable for any resulting deficit in your account.
(2) Under certain market conditions, you may find it difficult or impossible to
liquidate a position. This can occur, for example, when the market makes a "limit
move.
(3) Placing contingent orders, such as "stop-loss" or "stop-limit" order, will not
necessarily limit your losses to the intended amounts, since market conditions may
make it impossible to execute such orders.
(4) A "spread" position may not be less risky than a simple "long" or "short"
position.
(5) The high degree of leverage that is often obtainable in futures trading because of the small margin requirements can work against you as well as for you. The
use of leverage can lead to large losses as well as gains.
The brief statement cannot, of course, disclose all the risks and other significant
aspects of the commodity markets. You should therefore carefully study futures trading before you trade.
75. See, e.g., Akmajian v. International Commodity Options, Ltd., 11977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,584 (CFTC March 29, 1978) (claimant was granted
reparation due to insufficiency of disclosure statement). Walker v. Rosenthal & Co., 11977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. Furr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,627 (CFTC June 19, 1978) (verbal misrepresentations took precedence over written disclosure statements).
76. Speech by James M. Stone, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman to
the National Institute on Commodities Regulation (Dec. 7, 1979) (on file with M. Van Smith).
Understanding is not assured by a simple disclosure rule. The Commission has such
a rule--and I support it as far as it goes. Itdoes not, however, go very far. A disclosure boilerplate is easily undermined by fast talk. Disclosure to a woefully unsophisticated account prospect is often worth nothing at all. I recall from my previous job
with a shudder hearing that Massachusetts health insurance disclosure forms on pregnancy coverage were returned with signature by scores of elderly women in nursing
homes. A disclosure form by itself can serve the unscrupulous huckster at least as well
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It is evident from the euphemistic tenor of the CFTC's risk disclosure
statement 77 that it was intended to disclose as little as possible. If brokers
really wanted to disclose the risks of trading, they would acknowledge that
the prices of commodity futures are unpredictable and warn that any statements to the contrary are generally not to be believed.78 Brokers would also
need to disclose the conflict of interest between their interest incommissions
and a customer's interest in profits7 9 and the fact that generally brokers are
the ones most likely to profit. 80 The CFTC's risk disclosure statement is of
the genre of prospectus described as "a literary art form calculated to communicate as little of the essential information as possible while exuding an
air of total candor."8' The danger with the disclosure approach is that it
encourages the attitude that once brokers have made a token warning, customers are fair game for the hard sell.
V.

ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

Although a suitability duty is essential to countervail the conflict of interest inherent in the dealings between customers and brokers, it is unlikely
that the CFTC will promulgate a suitability rule for commodity futures until Congress threatens to legislate.8 2 Until there is a suitability rule, customers will have to rely on the common law to vindicate their rights.
A.

Common Law Duties

Under common law, brokers have a fiduciary duty to disclose to customers material facts of transactions concerning those customers.8 3 If the unsuitability of commodity futures trading is a material fact, then the
nondisclosure of that fact is a false representation. 4 Furthermore, because
brokers must act as fiduciaries, they can be held liable in constructive fraud
without an intent to deceive.8 5 Thus, under common law, brokers must adas it serves the public. Assurance of adequate customer understanding requires integrity throughout the entire sales process.
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1982).
78. A warning similar to this has been proposed for securities by one writer. See Note,
Broker Investment Recommendations and the EfJiient Capital Market Hypothesis. A Proposed Cautionary
Legend, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1077 (1977).
79. This kind of conflict would have to be disclosed prominently in a securities prospectus.
See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971), modified,
351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972); In re Managed Funds, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 313, 319 (1959).
80. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 20, at 253. "On being asked to whom the speculating
public's money goes, the commission house people are hard pressed for an answer. The most
usual explanation is that a good share falls through the slot in the table. That is, into the
paying of commissions, but this is only part of the story." Id at 250.
81. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,163, at
91,185 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
82. The CFTC only banned the sale of commodity options to the general public when
Congress started hearings to legislate such a ban. See Smith, supra note 21, at 32.
83. See Cecka v. Beckman & Co., 28 Cal. App. 3d 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1972); Bond &
Share Trading Corp. v. Insuransharer Corp., 40 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
84. See, e.g. , Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc. 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 222 (1968). (failure to inform customer that excessive trading unsuitable held a fraud).
85. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1573 (Deering 1971); Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d
329, 342, 364 P.2d 247, 256, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 80 (1961); County of Santa Cruz v. McLeod, 189
Cal. App. 2d 222, 234-35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 249, 253-54 (1961).
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vise their customers in accordance with a suitability duty to avoid defrauding their customers. Common law can be used to enforce a suitability
86
duty by applying conventional legal principles.
One difficulty customers will have in resorting to common law remedies
is that there is no common law duty to inquire of a prospective customer
whether commodity futures trading is suitable for that customer. 8 7 Thus,
unscrupulous brokers can avoid disclosing that commodity futures trading is
unsuitable by remaining ignorant of the finances and needs of prospective
customers. This could be countervailed by a law which recognizes that
when one advises another, it is implicit that the advice is suitable for the
88
person being advised.
B.

Duty Arising From Custom

Customers may also be able to hold brokers liable for losses from unsuitable commodity futures trading under a breach of duty arising out of custom. Custom is a practice that is so well accepted in a community that it has
the force of law.8 9 It is the practice of ethical commodity futures brokerage
firms to have procedures to determine whether commodity futures trading is
suitable for their customers. These procedures generally involve some inquiry to determine whether customers can afford the risk of commodity futures trading, whether they understand those risks, and whether they have
previously traded. A few firms will inquire into family obligations to determine whether the money a customer will use to trade is "risk capital"money that would not affect the standard of living if lost. The wire houses
often have a "dollar line," a procedure that allows a customer to trade a
percentage of his capital over and above his home and automobile. Although the procedures used by brokerage firms to determine suitability
would vary, the ethical firms have some way to determine whether commodity futures trading is suitable for their customers. And because of the prevalence of this practice, one can contend that it is the custom of commodity
futures firms to undertake a suitability duty.
Assuming it is the custom for ethical commodity futures brokerage firms
to follow procedures consonant with a suitability duty, this custom gives rise
to a legal duty under which a brokerage firm must operate when it accepts
the business of a customer. 90 Furthermore, the agreements that customers
86. See H. BINES, supra note 72, at 4.0112][a], 4-13; Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
87. Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash. App. 433, 628 P.2d 1336 (1981).
88. See, e.g., Feeney v. SEC, 564 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978);
University Hill Found. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Best
Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (1960).
89. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAars 10 (1961).
90. In Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1893), the Court stated: "Where a principal
sends an order to a broker engaged in an established market or trade, for a deal in that trade, he
confers authority upon the broker to deal according to any well-established usage in such market or trade.
... Similarily, in an article co-authored by William 0. Douglas, Bates & Douglas, Secondary Distrbution of Secunties-Problems Suggested by Kinney v. Glenny, 41 YALE L.J. 949
(1932), it was stated:
It would seem that the placing of an order to buy or sell by the customer and an
indication to the customer by the broker of his willingness to undertake to execute the
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sign when they open accounts generally provide that transactions will be
governed by the rules, regulations, customs, and usages of the markets where
transactions are executed. These agreements give rise to a suitability duty
by contract. Brokerage firms can undertake contractual duties that are not
imposed by general law. For example, in Iowa Grabn v. Farmers Gramh and Feed
Co. ,91 a brokerage firm was held liable for losses incurred because it failed to
comply with the duty it had undertaken in the customer's agreement to comply with exchange margin rules. The court held the brokerage firm liable for
breach of a contractual duty despite the cases holding that brokerage firms
are not liable, absent a specific contractual provision, for violation of exchange margin rules. 92 The reasoning of the cases holding brokers liable for
violating exchange rules that a brokerage firm has agreed to follow in its
customer's contract would also apply to holding brokers liable for violating
customs that a brokerage firm has agreed to follow in its customer's
93
contract.
Brokerage firms can argue that the practice of firms making a suitability
inquiry is not a custom, but merely a house rule for the protection of firms.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Goldman,94 a customer attempted to avoid liability for a deficit in his account on the ground that
commodity futures trading was unsuitable. The court decided that there
was no evidence of a suitability violation. 9 5 The court observed, moreover,
that absent fraud, there was no authority which recognized a private cause
of action for an alleged violation of house rules. 96 The customer did not
contend that the firm had a suitability duty by custom or that the house rule
in this case manifested a duty which the firm had undertaken by custom.
Probably the customer was unaware of the prevalence of the suitability inquiry in commodity futures or the significance of custom. Because the issue
of whether the brokerage firm had a suitability duty as imposed by custom
was never raised, the court could not decide this issue. Nevertheless, the case
suggests the line of defense that brokerage firms can take against the contention that there is a legal duty imposed by custom to inquire into the suitability of commodities trading.
As noted previously, the courts have yet to decide the question of
whether there is a custom of commodity futures brokerage firms undertaking
a suitability duty. Nevertheless, when this issue is finally considered, the
following factors should demonstrate the existence of this custom: 1) the
order give rise to a bilateral contract. The mutual promises are all implied in fact
being based on the common undertaking of the parties, the way in which such business is normally conducted, and the custom and usage of particular markets or
exchanges.
Id at 965.

91. 293 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 1980). See also First Mid America, Inc. v. Palmer, 197 Neb. 224,
248 N.W.2d 30 (1976) (broker agreed to follow exchange rules); S. WILLISTON, supra note 75,
§ 651 at 32, 34.
92. See, e.g., John S. Morris & Co. v. Mezvinsky, 24 A.D.2d 950, 265 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1965);
Dupont v. Neiman, 156 Cal. App. 2d 313, 319 P.2d 60 (1957).
93. See S. WILLISTON, supra note 89, at 36.

94. 593 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1979).
95. Id at 133.
96. Id at 134.
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practice of writing off deficits because of the pall of illegality which hung
over commodity futures, 97 2) the exchange rules, 98 3) the prevalence of
brokerage firm procedures to determine suitability, 99 and 4) the general assumption that it is wrong for persons for whom commodity futures trading is
unsuitable to trade.1l ° Even the CFTC's risk disclosure statement is some
indication of the existence of this custom. Finally, the most compelling argument should be that ethically commodity futures brokers, who hold themselves out to their customers as professionals, and who benefit from the trust
they instill in their customers, should uphold a duty commensurate with this
trust.
C. Judictally Imposed Suitability
Although the judicial system can fashion a suitability duty from the
common law, it is not well suited to this task. The randomness of cases and
the limitation of cases to their facts make the formation of policy through
case-by-case adjudication a slow process. 10 1 Courts are adversarial rather
than inquisitorial tribunals, depending on litigants to develop the facts on
which decisions are based. The courts do not have the expertise that is available to administrative agencies, which can bring their expertise and investigative capability to bear on a problem.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Ironically, the brokerage community may have the most to lose under
the CFTC's obstructionist policy. Brokers, as well as customers, will lose the
protection a suitability rule could provide. Brokers are confronted with an
uncertain potential liability for losses of customers for whom commodity futures trading is unsuitable. This uncertainty is a two-edged sword. While
brokerage firms may escape liability to some customers, they will be exposed
to potential liability for damages-especially punitive damages-from
others. The CFTC could ameliorate this potential liability by promulgating
a rule which would define the contours of brokers' suitability duty. If brokers complied with such a rule, this compliance could be urged as a defense
97. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 63; Irwin, supra note 14, at 155.
98. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule, supra note 30, and accompanying text.
99. See Hearings Before Comm. on Agniulture and Forestg, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 514 (1973) (state-

ment of Paul H. Franklin, Vice President and Director of Commodities Division for Merrill
Lynch).
100. In the congressional hearings in 1973 which preceded the adoption of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Michael Weinberg, Jr., Chairman of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, alluded to the importance of screening customers with respect to the issue
of the suitability of commodity futures trading:
We have advertised-and told our member firms-that only persons with excess risk
capital, above their living and savings needs, should be in any market. We have held
seminars, talked at colleges, produced millions of brochures, and gone on radio and
TV-all over the country--passing the word that the commodity world is one of excitement, but it should be approachedonly by persons with the temperament, knowledge and support to properly use it.

Small Business Problems Involved In The Marketing of Grain and Other Commodities: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1973) (statement
by Michael Weinberg, Chairman, Chicago Mercantile Exchange) (emphasis added).
101. See Cohen & Rabin, supra note 69, at 692.
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to liability. Furthermore, by knowing what is expected of them, brokers
could adopt procedures to guard themselves from potential liability.
Brokers would benefit from a suitability duty promulgated by the
CFTC rather than one hammered out by litigants in the courts. If a suitability duty is a corollary to honest advice, the CFTC's refusal to adopt a suitability duty could be perceived as deference to the brokerage community.
This could persuade the courts that there is a need to overcome the CFTC's
unjust protection of brokers at the customers' expense. The reaction may be
10 2
a suitability duty of draconian harshness.
Consider what has happened to the medical profession. For years, doctors were able to suppress patients being able to recover malpractice claims
by refusing to testify against fellow doctors. 10 3 The courts countered this
conspiracy of silence with the doctrine of res tpsa loquztur, "the happening of
an unusual occurrence which creates an inference of negligence on the part
of the doctor."' 1° Out of necessity, the courts became so receptive to this
doctrine that doctors were put in the position of having to prove their absence of malpractice. 10 5 How different it would have been if the medical
profession had faced up to its responsibilities instead of making aggrieved
patients and the courts do it for them.
The rejection by the CFTC of a suitability rule and the efforts by this
agency to undermine any suitability duty which brokers have under the
Commodity Exchange Act once again demonstrate that the public would
have been far better off had there never been a CFTC. 106 The CFTC wants
to appear to be carrying out its mandate, while serving the interests of the
brokerage community. Hence the analogy to the pea and shell game-"now
you see it, now you don't."

102. See H. BINEs, supra note 72, at 4.01[2][b], 4-17 n.54. "In its present stage of development, the suitability doctrine leaves unresolved many questions which could lead to harsh results if there were an absolute rule that violation of suitability standards would lead to civil

liability." Id.
103. See Ames, Modern Techniques in the Preparation and Trnal ofa MalpracticeSuit, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 129-30 (T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
104. See McCoid, The Care RequiredofMedica/Practitioners,in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 85
(T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
105. Id at 91.
106. See, e.g. , Smith, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Return ofthe Bucketeers. A
Lesson In Regulatory Failure, 57 N.D.L. REV. 7, 41 (1981). For another example, the CFTC has
recently proposed rules to promote binding arbitration to the exclusion of its own jurisdiction
and thereby foster the interest of brokerage firms in having disputes with their customers arbitrated by their fellow brokers. See COMM. FtrT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,608, at 26,332 (Oct. 28,
1982). See Smith, Breaking the Chains That Bind: Arbitration Agreements Versus Forum Rights Under the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974r, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 749, 770 (1979) (pre-

dicting the CFTC proposal of such binding arbitration).

